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Abstract
International immigration a⁄ects the degree of cultural diversity present in a labour force. This
paper focuses on the consequences of immigration with respect to the level of cultural diversity by
estimating employment functions for individual establishments. The theory behind the empirical
analyses is based on a ￿turned around￿ New Economic Geography model. The data basis used is
a linked employer ￿employee data set generated by a fusion of the IAB Establishment Panel with
the Employment Statistics of Germany, which provides very detailed information about individual
workers and establishments. In the empirical analyses it is shown that employment is lower when the
degree of diversity is higher, regarding the revenue of an individual establishment as given. From this
result it can be derived under the conditions of monopolistic competition (implying elastic product
demand) that the establishment is able to occupy a relatively large part of the market. Finally this
implies relatively high labour demand.
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11 Introduction
The e⁄ects of immigration on labour markets have been explored in many papers. Most studies have
concentrated on employment and wages and relate immigration ￿ ows to these crucial variables. Recently,
Ottaviano and Peri (2005, 2006) chose a di⁄erent perspective in two seminal papers. They related regional
labour market outcomes, i.e. wages and employment, to the cultural diversity of the labour force. They
were able to demonstrate for American metropolitan areas that diversity is a production amenity for a
region and therefore has favourable labour market e⁄ects.
This result is interesting since the developed nations show an increasingly heterogeneous labour force
due to both legal and illegal immigration. A further increase can be expected in the future because
of the changing demographic composition of the population and the shrinking of the younger cohorts
in many countries. It is therefore important to observe the e⁄ects of this heterogeneity on society
and the economy. The fractionalization of the labour force may imply excessive transaction costs for
communication and, in fact, lower productivity. It is important to see whether this ￿Babylon e⁄ect￿
prevails among people who are not able to understand each other. On the other hand workers with
di⁄erent cultural backgrounds may possess complementary skills and problem-solving abilities. When
these workers interact, productivity may rise due to these complementarities or because of other forms
of externalities. If this is true, heterogeneity leads to new productive solutions.
Ottaviano and Peri found for American cities that the latter e⁄ect prevails. Their results, however,
cannot easily be transferred to other countries owing to the many institutional and legal di⁄erences.
Immigration traditions and general attitudes towards immigrants are very di⁄erent. Some countries have
a history of immigration and others have not. Studies about other countries are therefore most helpful
to determine whether Ottaviano and Peri￿ s results could be generalized. There are some corresponding
papers available at the moment. Suedekum, Wolf and Blien (2010) conducted research into the German
economy and also found favourable labour market e⁄ects. Bellini et al. (2008) used data on several
European countries. Niebuhr (2010) related the regional frequency of patents in Germany to cultural
diversity and found a positive relationship.
In this paper we intend to narrow the focus and identify the e⁄ects of cultural diversity at the level
of individual establishments, whereas Ottaviano and Peri (and Suedekum et al.) looked at the regional
level. The advantage is that the link between the composition of the work force and a potential productive
amenity can be studied more closely. With this approach a ￿turned around￿model of New Economic
Geography can be applied directly to derive the level of employment within individual establishments. It
is also possible to control for possible endogenous e⁄ects in an e⁄ective way.
2We are able to follow this approach since we can use very detailed information in a linked employer-
employee data-set. The IAB Establishment Panel for Germany has the advantage of being a representative
panel for a large economy which has been surveyed in annual waves for over 16 years now. The data
of this panel are fused with data from the employment statistics providing very detailed information on
the active work force. This data basis reveals over 215 nationalities, which are used as proxies for the
respective cultural backgrounds.
The research which forms the background to the paper is part of the NORFACE research programme
on migration (Migrant Diversity and Regional Disparity in Europe ￿MIDI-REDIE project). We gratefully
acknowledge the many ideas and comments we have received in this context.
2 Literature and theoretical model
There are various channels via which cultural diversity a⁄ects economic outcomes. Ottaviano and Peri
discuss two basic mechanisms: diversity could be a consumption amenity or a production amenity of a
region. Starting with the latter point, cultural diversity could lead to a more diversi￿ed production. A
tolerant population could enjoy speciality restaurants and many di⁄erent products available under the
conditions of regional diversity. With respect to the production amenity mentioned in the introduction,
the fragmentation of the labour force can lead to new complementarities in the production process.
New variants of labour division can be explored and productivity increased. Besides this, diversity could
matter in research activities. Bringing together people with di⁄erent cultural backgrounds could generate
many innovative ideas, which could in turn increase productivity levels.
As announced in the introduction we concentrate not on the regional but on the establishment level.
In our case it is therefore not of interest whether a region could o⁄er a di⁄erentiated product to its inhab-
itants. The case of the consumption amenity could be excluded in our analysis. Whereas Ottaviano and
Peri need the Roback (1982) model to identify the exact e⁄ects of diversity, in our case the assumptions
of this model are not required. These are rather strong, especially for the European case, since complete
and cost-free mobility of workers and capital are assumed in the Roback model.
We intend to measure directly the e⁄ects of diversity on labour demand via production advantages
by focusing on individual establishments, i.e. productive plants, which represent the lowest level which
can be a⁄ected by diversity in production. At higher levels one can not be sure whether the e⁄ect of
diversity is due to productivity gains of individual establishments or because of externalities emerging from
aggregation. In existing empirical literature externality measures add to the regression equation to control
for Jacobs or Marshall-Arrow-Romer externalities (see Glaeser et al. (1992) for the identi￿cation of this
3kind of externalities). The inclusion of those measures in a model on ￿rm level is possible as long as they
in￿ uence (total) factor productivity. However, factor productivity on plant level might not necessarily
change because of appearing externalities at higher levels of aggregation when externalities a⁄ect other
variables. For example, those factors are regional wages or product demand which are partially exogenous
for an individual ￿rm. We therefore explicitely control for the presence of externalities, especially those
derived by the New Economic Geography (agglomeration and competition forces). As it will be shown,
agglomeration and competition e⁄ects in￿ uence demand and do not a⁄ect labour productivity.
In the following we outline a new theoretical model to show how cultural diversity in production
might in￿ uence the factor productivity of a single production unit. We treat diversity in a way similar
to the one chosen by Ottaviano and Peri (2005). They regard diversity in analogy to agglomeration
forces. Before we turn to the e⁄ect of cultural diversity in production, we derive product demand based
on household utility maximisation to work out the impact of externalities. This helps to understand
the e⁄ect of regional externalities on an individual ￿rm and makes it possible to introduce additional
(external) instruments for partially endogenous variables. In contrast to Ottaviano and Peri (2005) we
do not aggregate industries to a regional production function since we wish to focus on the ￿rm level. In
this respect, our model is more general.
For simplicity we assume that ￿rms￿customers are households. A representative household in region s
spends its money Es on a variety of consumables Xsi provided by sector i. For simplicity we assume that
utility Us is of the Cobb-Douglas type. Each Xsi is a composite commodity of xin products of distinct
producers where Ni labels the mass of ￿rms in that sector. The aggregation of xin is done with the aid





















in is the consumption good in region s
of ￿rm n which could be located in any region. All other things being equal, utility increases the more
diverse the supply of products is, which implies Ni rising. Calculation of the Marshallian demand of each
region and summing up across all regions gives the gross demand of a single ￿rm,











ik is the consumer price in region s ￿rm k of sector i. qin is the mill price of the n￿th producer,
￿rs are trade costs of the iceberg type. We can express demand in terms of revenue when we multiply
4both sides of (2) by a ￿rm￿ s mill price. This gives











The sum term is called the real market potential (RMP) of a single ￿rm (see Head and Mayers (2004)
for a discussion). The nominator refers to household expenditure and its regional distribution, whereas
the denominator is a measure of the price level of the sector under consideration in any region s. Despite
the assumption that the CES index represents household utility, the key implication is that the RMP
features agglomeration and dispersion forces based on a microeconomic foundation; see e.g. Redding and
Venables (2004). Thus, from equation (3) it can be seen that within the revenue measure qin￿ xin home
market magnitudes and competition e⁄ects are implicitly controlled for. Using a revenue proxy therefore
automatically controls for agglomeration forces and (regional) competition e⁄ects. We should also bear
in mind that a ￿rm￿ s revenue is an endogenous variable depending on expenditure and the distribution
of ￿rms.
Now we focus on ￿rms￿maximisation problem to provide this quantity ￿ xin. With market clearing, the
total output ￿ xin is produced under constant returns to scale with respect to labour Ln and capital Kn.
The workforce might be culturally diverse, where smn is the share of workers belonging to nationality
m and Mn is the total number of nationalities employed. In the following we assume a Cobb-Douglas
production function with

























n (1 ￿ ￿n)
￿i DIV ￿i
n ; ￿n 2 (0;1);
where ￿i is the sector-speci￿c elasticity of labour substitution. ￿n and DIVn are variables that a⁄ect
labour productivity and are introduced in the following.
Suppose that all labour is of the same nationality i, implying sin = 1 and thus DIVn = 1. In the
case of a heterogenous workforce, however, an additional positive e⁄ect on output occurs. If there are
more than one cultural groups employed, DIVn exceeds the value 1 and increases factor productivity.
This in turn raises ￿ xin for a given Ln and Kn. Conversely, a higher degree of fragmentation of the
employed workforce needs less employment Ln to produce a given ￿ xin. From an empirical point of view
the DIVn ￿term is hard to grasp because it contains an additional parameter within the sum. It is clear
5however, that the more culturally diverse a workforce Ln is, the higher output is. For ￿i ! 1, a positive
impact of diversity on output disappears.
Ottaviano and Peri (2005) introduce ￿n with the aim of including also a negative e⁄ect of diversity. ￿n
is restricted between 0 and 1 and is an increasing function of the number of cultures present. Up to same
degree it works in the opposite direction compared to DIVn. Due to language barriers, coordination and
transaction cost gains of diversity could melt away such that the overall e⁄ect of diversity gets lowered,
insigni￿cant or even negative. Then, the higher ￿n is the lower is labour productivity and consequently
the lower ￿ xin has to be, for a given Ln and Kn.
It is not clear whether ￿rms know about the positive or negative e⁄ect of a culturally diverse workforce.
If they did know, then every ￿rm would employ a culturally diverse workforce that maximises the DIVn￿
term and which keeps ￿n as small as possible. At this stage of modelling we assume that a ￿rm does not
know about productivity gains and DIVn is a part of the (unobservable) factor productivity.
We can minimise costs with respect to capital and labour. For a given wage level w, a capital price r





















An increase in r raises employment because capital becomes relatively more expensive. A rise in wages, on
the other hand, lowers employment because labour becomes relatively more expensive. Now focus on the
e⁄ect of diversity. The more diverse the hired workforce is, the lower employment is. The second e⁄ect
relates to capital input. Furthermore, because of a diversity e⁄ect, less capital is necessary to produce a
given output. The labour-capital relation is, however, una⁄ected by a culturally diverse workforce, since
the L=K ratio depends only on relative prices and parameters of the production function. If we now














Taking the logarithm yields





+ (1 ￿ ￿i)lnr ￿ (1 ￿ ￿i)lnw
￿￿i lnDIVn ￿ ￿i ln(1 ￿ ￿n) + lnrevenuen ￿ lnPn:
6This equation can be considered in empirical terms. The price of a good produced by a single ￿rm is
unobservable, so lnPn is included in the error term. Since there are no data on capital and its price,
lnr is also included in the error term. Both variables are partially absorbed by a) the ￿xed e⁄ects
transformation and b) the inclusion of time dummy variables. Then the empirical model becomes
lnLn = ￿0i + ￿1i lnw + ￿2i lnDIVn + ￿3i ln(1 ￿ ￿n) + ￿4i lnrevenuen + ￿xn + un + " (4)
In the following section we introduce the data set and motivate further control variables xn.
3 Estimation issues and hypothesis
The data are taken from the German Establishment History Panel (Betriebshistorik-Panel - BHP) which
is generated from the Employment Statistics and the representative survey, the IAB Establishment Panel,
both provided by the Institute for Employment Research (IAB).
The parameters of (4) are industry speci￿c and there are further regional and ￿rm-speci￿c e⁄ects.
For this reason we conduct a ￿xed-e⁄ects transformation at establishment level to eleminate these and
other time-constants variables. We apply an industry classi￿cation on a 3 digit level (wz93) and consider
215 distinct industries. We only consider industries which achieve revenues, so non-pro￿t organisations,
the public and the ￿nancial sectors are not taken into consideration.
The dependent variable is an establishment￿ s employed workforce. We use the average daily employ-
ment in full-time equivalents in order to control for part-time workers.
The theoretical model outlined above shows the impact of cultural fragmentation on the employment
level. There, the DIV -measure relates to the labour distribution between nationalities and is mixed with
the total number of employed nationalities. To measure the cultural background of an employee we use
her or his nationaltiy as a proxy as Suedekum et al (2010) do, whereas Ottaviano and Peri use language
as a proxy. To capture the fragmentation e⁄ect we use two steps. First, we focus on the share of employed
foreigners, sforeign. This measure relates to the general presence of foreigners and answers the question
of whether an increase of employed non-German increases or reduces employment. However, as outlined
in the theoretical discussion, the distribution between di⁄erent cultures (respectively nationalities) within
the workforce might matter as well. For this reason, the second variable used is the Her￿ndahl-Hirschman
index, de￿ned as





7It is worth noting that the DIVn is zero for ￿rms that only employ Germans. It rises the more nationalities
are employed and the more uniformly distributed the smn are. With regards to content, it might be that
an increase in Mn leads to negative diversity e⁄ects (such as the Babylon e⁄ect). We therefore add
another variable lnMforeign
n to the model which is the number of employed non-German nationalities.
The indicator is zero when no or at least one non-German nationality is employed. The BHP considers
215 distinct foreign nationalities, so the maximum of M could theoretically be 215.
The data reveal that 95% of all ￿rms employ ￿ 12 distinct nationalities and have a maximum share
of foreign employees of 22.3%. 50% of culturally diverse ￿rms employ up to 4 di⁄erent nationalities. The
regional maximum of represented non-German nationalities is 199 (Berlin) followed by Munich, Hamburg,
Frankfurt and Cologne - Germany￿ s biggest metropolitan cities.
The diversity problem can only be explored reasonably for a population including foreigners. The
impact of DIVn on employment is visualised in ￿gure 1, employing at least one fulltime equivalent
worker. The graph contains a linear univariate regression between DIVn and lnLn. The upper part of
the ￿gure includes all cultural diverse establishments whereas the lower part considers the diversity for a
given number of foreign nationalities. Here we only consider DIVn for up to six employed non-German
nationalities. All ￿gures clearly show a negative trend, which gives ￿rst evidence that cultural diversity,
and especially the distribution over nationalities, lowers total employment. However, these pictures do
not account for the impact of other variables and therefore multivariate regression should be applied.
Figure 2 visualises the distribution of our diversity measure DIVn for all establishments employing
at least 5 workers (in full time equivalents). Note, that we restrict the ￿gure and only consider DIVn
less or equal to the 99th percentile for the left panel and drop the ￿rst and last percentile in the right
panel. The left part of the ￿gure clearly shows that highly diverse establishments do not occure often,
since the distribution exhibits a strong positive skew. Note, that 75% of all establishments employing
non-Germans exhibit a value of DIVn of less than 0.254. However, the ￿gure shows the distribution of all
￿rms. Therefore, in the right part we visualise the distribution of DIVn after the ￿xed-e⁄ects (within)
transformation. The values are quite equal distributed around zero. There is no pattern of discrete jumps
or steps as it might occur considering changes in a Her￿ndahl-Hirschman index1.
To summarize, there is variation of employed labour force with respect to cultural diversity on an
establishment level. Does this variation lead to productivity gains?
Multiple regression is applied to separate the impact of cultural diversity from other e⁄ects which
in￿ uence employment. We carry out further regressions in which only cultural diverse establishments are
considered, i.e. DIVn > 0. This is a simple check of the robustness of our ￿ndings. Finally we control
1A similar picture occurs for the ￿rst-di⁄erence operation.
8Figure 1: Impact of Diversity on Employment
for the potential problem of endogeneity of the DIVn and lnMforeign
n measures and use its lagged values
as instruments.
The inclusion of control variables can be derived in part from our theoretical model. This is so
in the case of the real market potential, which is approximated by the establishment￿ s revenue. The
model suggests a positive e⁄ect of revenues on total employment. As was mentioned in the theoretical
part, the revenue measure is endogenous and depends on competition and demand e⁄ects. For this
reason we include the population density and the regional sector-speci￿c establishment density in logs as
instruments. Because we can observe all regionally established production units with the BHP, we can
access a rather low level of the industry classi￿cation, i.e. we consider the 3-digit level. Both instruments
9Figure 2: Distribution of the diversity index
are incomplete measures for the nominator and denominator of the real market potential because they do
not control for the sum across regions. We therefore additionally incorporate the time lag of revenue as
an instrument, which, however, leads to a loss of cases. We label the resulting model as IV and estimate
it with 2SLS.
The wage rate is also an important variable from a theoretical perspective. We use the average daily
wage per employee and expect a negative sign. The variable monopoly is a dummy indicator and is set
to unity when the establishment has no regional competitor. Whereas revenue captures the demand side
and therefore already includes the potentially higher demand due to the regional monopoly situation, the
monopoly variable captures productivity e⁄ects. Because of a lack of competition a regional monopoly
could operate less e¢ ciently. We therefore expect a positive sign.
Another branch of literature highlights positive productivity e⁄ects appearing in exporting ￿rms.
Again, for given revenues an establishment faces international competition and has to be therefore relative
more productive. To capture this e⁄ect we add the export share to EU countries to the regression model.
The variable is labeled as sexport EU. We expect a negative sign.
We further control for the state of the technology and machinery. Within the IAB Establishment Panel
this information is provided on an ordinal scale such that we use four distinct dummy indicators ranging
10from state-of-the-art equipment to "out of date" equipment. As the reference category we chose the second
best category of equipment age. There is also information on whether parts of the establishment have
been in- or outsourced. This directly a⁄ects the employment level and should therefore been controlled
for. Another variables are the share of human capital sH, measured as the share of employees holding a
university degree and the share of women employed swomen.
The observation period of the panel coverts the period from 1999 to 2008 with yearly waves. Time
￿xed e⁄ects are taken into account using dummy variables.
Table 1 contains the estimation results of a regression of the establishment￿ s employment in full-time
equivalents lnLn. The ￿rst columns contain the baseline model not controlling for employed foreigners.
In the next three columns the regression results are presented which include the share of employed
foreigners sforeign and the log of the number of employed foreign nationalities, lnMforeign
n . The last
columns report the estimates where we consider the diversity of the workforce DIVn instead of sforeign.
Establishment-speci￿c e⁄ects are controlled for in each of the blocks. Besides ￿xed e⁄ects we also report
random e⁄ects estimates for the sake of completeness although the Hausman test rejects the validity of
the RE models. Another Hausman test based on non-robust standard errors indicates that pure FE is
inconsistent and an IV estimator performs better with regard to the endogenous lnMforeign
n ; sforeign
and DIVn measures and lnrevenue. The Davidson-MacKinnon test of exogeneity con￿rms this result,
while obtaining a highly signi￿cant value for the FE model. It therefore also rejects the pure FE model in
favour of the FE IV speci￿cation. Though the Sargan test rejects the validity of the chosen instruments,
the Hansen￿ s J-statistics supports these considering all establishments. Hansen￿ s J test is robust against
some misspeci￿cation and heteroscedasticity and should therefore be prefered over the Sargan test. The
IV estimates can be severly biased if the chosen instruments are weak. In that case the correlation
between instruments and endogenous variables is weak. We follow the procedure suggested by Stock and
Watson (2003, Ch. 10) and conclude that the instruments have explanatory power and the estimates do
not su⁄er from the weak instruments problem. Because the FE IV approach yields consistent estimates
compared to the FE and RE and RE IV models, this model is the preferred one. The model selection














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































12Irrespective of the estimation strategy, the parameter estimates are jointly signi￿cant, indicating the
general explanatory power of the model.
Before interpreting the results concerning the main variables, sforeign, DIVn and lnMforeign
n , we
look at the e⁄ects of the controlling variables. In general, the results of the ￿xed e⁄ects (FE) models are
fairly similar to those of the ￿xed e⁄ects instrumental variable models (FE IV). As expected, the impact
of wages on employment is negative. An establishment￿ s revenue exhibits a positive sign and a highly
signi￿cant coe¢ cient of 0.53. An increase in demand results in the necessity to increase the workforce.
The parameter is far from one because the size e⁄ect is partly taken out by the ￿xed e⁄ects included in
the model.
Other empirical studies based on the IAB Establishment Panel typically use the share of women
employed to address the issue of part-time jobs. Not surprisingly, our estimate of swomen is insigni￿cant
because the explanatory variable is measured in full-time equivalents. Thus, an e⁄ect of part-time jobs
is already controlled for. The insigni￿cant result also indicates that women do not a⁄ect productivity
in any direction compared to men. Establishments which use relatively more human capital have lower
employment levels on average, given the revenue level. This is due to the fact that better educated
workers are more productive. It is somewhat surprising that the state of equipment and machinery does
not a⁄ect employment levels. A test of the joint signi￿cance of the equipment variables also yields an
insigni￿cant p-value. Again, this might be due to the fact that these variables show little variation over
time and are therefore correlated with the ￿xed e⁄ects.
As was expected, a ￿rm with a regional monopoly uses more labour in production compared to others,
cetarus paribus, indicating that monopoly situations lead to ine¢ cient production. However, the e⁄ect
is insigni￿cant. Focussing on exporting establishments reveals that these ￿rms are on average smaller to
produce a given amount. This e⁄ect disappears for the subsample of only cultural diverse establishments.
Let us now turn to the diversity issue. First, the e⁄ect of the variable lnMforeign
n is positive, i.e.
it is associated with higher employment levels. Without any further control variables about the foreign
workers employed, potentially unfavourable properties of these workers are taken over by this variable.
Relatively small proportions of higher education as well as matching problems with regard to education
(possibly acquired in a foreign country) play a role in this respect. More work is required for a given
level of revenues, as can be seen from the positive e⁄ect of the number of employed nationalities, which is
highly signi￿cant in the FE and FE IV models. Even more, a higher level of employment is necessary if
a further nationality is included to the existing ones for given revenues and wages. Since we focus on the
change of the number of employed nationalities, this negative e⁄ect can be interpreted as Babylon-e⁄ect.
As was shown in the theoretical part not only the absolute value of employed nationalities matters but
13also the distribution of the workforce. This leads to the interpretation of sforeign and DIVn.
Within the FE model the e⁄ect of of both variables is insigni￿cant. However, controlling for their
endogeneity while using lagged values as instruments gives a di⁄erent picture: in the FE IV model cultural
diversity lowers total employment signi￿cantly, which is in line with the expectation from the theoretical
model. The e⁄ect exhibits a value of -0.521 for DIVn and -0.679 for sforeign. Thus, an increase in the
share of employed foreigners increases productivity. To set the focus on DIVn implies the concentration
on the distribution of the workforce. Is it worth to employ a rather mixed workforce or to hire only
workers from a speci￿c non-German nationality? Following Mforeign
n , it would be better to employ only
few di⁄erent nationalities. However, according to the underlying approach, a more diverse workforce with
respect to its distribution yields productivity gains. The estimate of DIVn is highly signi￿cant, indicating
that a distribution over nationalities matters. The more equal the distribution is, the lower is employment
(and the higher is productivity). According to the model, the estimate of the diversity measure should be
￿￿ whereas the wage measure should be 1 ￿ ￿. Insofar, our estimates are only qualitatively in line with
the theory at ￿rst sight. However, note that the DIVn only approximates the theoretical CES -index.
Especially the exponent of the outer bracket is also included in the estimated coe¢ cient.
The indicator variables of cultural diversity should be considered together because they relate to dif-
ferent questions. For a given number of employed nationalities, a more uniform distribution between them
is in favour of productivity gains. Adding a further nationality, on the other hand, lowers productivity.
However, one should be aware of interpreting the result and conclude that the best strategy would be to
employ only one foreign nationality. As shown in ￿gure 1, di⁄erent employed nationalities can achieve
similar combinations between DIVn and lnLn. It is important to note, that ￿n and DIVn are partly
independent of each other. Especially for a given number of nationalities, represented by ￿n, an increase
of diversity will increase productivity.
How robust is this result of cultural diversity? As was stated above, in the next step we restrict the
sample and consider only establishments which exhibit a value greater than zero for the diversity index
(DIVn > 0). The reason for this restriction is that there might be factors which are not captured so far.
Especially the decision of employing foreigners or not might in￿ uence the results. The results obtained
for the restricted population are shown in the regression table 2 in the appendix. Though the sample
size and the number of establishments (groups) are reduced, the picture obtained for the full sample still
holds, with di⁄erences in details. Interestingly, in the FE model of the smaller sample the sforeign and
DIVn measure are already signi￿cantly negative. The IV estimate exhibits almost the same value as that
in the unrestricted model. The results obtained on diversity are therefore con￿rmed.
In the restricted sample wages do not a⁄ect employment to the same extent as before. There are
14several explanations for this: ￿rst, we now consider larger establishments. These are more likely to have
a works council and it is more complicated for them to lay o⁄ employees. Second, larger ￿rms typically
pay wages based on collective agreements.
The literature on labour demand typically argues that the recruitment decision of personnel is jointly
determined with the payment decision. This decision raises the suspicion of endogeneity issues of wages.
We therefore instrument wages as another robustness check. The estimates and signi￿cances are not
a⁄ected indicating that the estimates of Table 1 do not su⁄er from an endogeneity bias. Thus, we can
rely on the parsimonious model and the interpretation above.
The e⁄ect of employed human capital is also larger (in absolute terms) in the restricted sample.
This ￿rst evidence supports the hypothesis that the level of employment depends on cultural diversity.
4 Conclusions
This paper focuses on employment levels depending on a more or less culturally diverse workforce. Based
on a production function we derive a small theoretical model which is close to those found in the New
Economic Geography literature. We use this model to develop an empirical approach which enables us to
identify the e⁄ect of a culturally diverse workforce. The main advantage of our data is that they include
information about individual ￿rms. To avoid problems of endogeneity a 2SLS method is used.
When a culturally diverse workforce is hired and there are productivity gains as a result of cultural
interaction, it is to be expected that relatively less labour is needed. This hypothesis is supported by
estimations based on the underlying model. We employ German data at establishment level, because this
is the lowest level where a culturally diverse workforce could generate production gains. It is una⁄ected
by possible e⁄ects at a higher level. We further control for market size and competition e⁄ects in￿ uencing
agglomeration forces, which are implicitly included in revenues and thus also integrated into our models.
What are the conclusions concerning labour market e⁄ects based on the results received? At ￿rst sight
it seems as if diversity is bad for employment. Establishments with a higher degree of diversity are more
productive; given a speci￿c level of revenues their employment level is lower. How is this result compatible
with those obtained by Ottaviano and Peri and Suedekum et al., who state that the productive amenity
which diversity represents for regions implies a higher level of employment? The answer is simple: our
analysis treats the level of revenues as given and therefore concentrates on a productivity e⁄ect. Under
the conditions of monopolistic competition (which we assume) ￿rms operate in a market with elastic
product demand. As can be shown under general assumptions, higher productivity is associated with
higher labour demand if the ￿rms face an elastic product demand (Appelbaum and Schettkat 1999,
15Cingano and Schivardi 2004, Blien and Sanner 2006). There is a direct e⁄ect of high productivity on
labour demand, which is the labour saving e⁄ect. There is also a compensating e⁄ect that works in the
opposite direction, since it is pro￿table for ￿rms to lower their prices to sell more, which increases not
only their sales but also their labour demand. Under the condition of elastic demand on the product
market this secondary e⁄ect prevails.
Therefore, the conclusion is that diversity is associated with favourable labour market e⁄ects. The
results we obtain are in line with those of other literature on diversity. We are able to show the empirical
microfoundations of the papers operating at a regional level.
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